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i
Robust Ordinal Regression in case of Imprecise Evaluations
Abstract
Robust Ordinal Regression (ROR) is a way of dealing with Multiple Criteria Decision
Aiding (MCDA), by considering all sets of parameters of an assumed preference model,
that are compatible with preference information given by the Decision Maker (DM).
As a result of ROR, one gets necessary and possible preference relations in the set of
alternatives, which hold for all compatible sets of parameters or for at least one compatible
set of parameters, respectively. In this paper, we extend the MCDA methods based on
ROR, by considering one important aspect of decision problems: imprecise evaluations.
To deal with imprecise evaluations of some alternatives on particular criteria, we extend
the set of considered variables to define necessary and possible preference relations taking
into account this imprecision. In consequence, the concepts of necessary and possible
preference represent not only all compatible sets of parameters, but also all possible
values of the imprecise evaluations of alternatives.
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1 Introduction
Multiple criteria decision aiding methods face three different types of problems: ranking, sorting and
choice. A ranking problem consists in rank ordering of all considered alternatives, from the worst to
the best, taking into account their evaluations on the considered criteria; a sorting problem consists in
assigning each alternative to one or several predefined and ordered classes; a choice problem consists
in selecting a set of alternatives considered the best or discarding a set of bad alternatives from the
whole set of alternatives (for a detailed survey see [7]). In order to deal with these problems, two
different methodologies can be used:
• assigning to each alternative a value given by a utility function, i.e. a real number reflecting
its degree of desirability,
• comparing the alternatives with respect to their evaluations on the considered criteria.
In the first case, the Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) [19] is most frequently used; MAUT
provides a methodology for building a value function assigning a real number to each alternative.
In the second case, the most popular are outranking methods which build an outranking relation in
the set of alternatives that compare them pairwise [26, 3]. In the context of MAUT, one often uses
additive value functions, that is functions obtained by adding up as many marginal value functions
as there are evaluation criteria. In order to use this kind of procedure, one needs to construct
all the marginal value functions. The construction requires some preference information elicited
by the Decision Maker (DM). An analyst can obtain them in one of two ways: asking the DM to
provide it directly, or indirectly. As direct definition of marginal value functions requires too big
cognitive effort from the part of the DM, indirect elicitation of preference information prevails in the
literature (see, e.g.,[17],[29],[25]). Indirect preference information is expressed by the DM in terms of
decision examples, e.g., holistic pairwise comparisons of some reference alternatives. When looking
for an additive value function which is compatible with decision examples provided by the DM, i.e.
reproduces decisions made by the DM, one can find many such compatible value functions, and, in
general, each of these functions can give a different answer to the decision problem at hand. For this
reason, Robust Ordinal Regression (ROR) was proposed (see, e.g.,[13],[8],[15],[16]), that takes into
consideration all compatible value functions simultaneously. In the context of ROR, two preference
relations are considered:
• possible preference relation, for which alternative a is possibly preferred to alternative b if a is
at least as good as b for at least one compatible value function, and
• necessary preference relation, for which alternative a is necessarily preferred to alternative b if
a is at least as good as b for all compatible value functions.
Observe that ROR has been also used in case of preference models expressed in terms of outranking
methods [12],[18], in case of non-additive integrals [2], so as also in presence of criteria structured in
a hierarchical way [5].
In this paper, we introduce one important issue more to ROR: imprecise evaluations of alter-
natives. In many real world problems, alternatives are imprecisely evaluated with respect to the
considered criteria; this is due to several reasons: for example, inexact definition of criteria, un-
certainty or imprecision of data used for calculation of performances of alternatives on particular
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criteria, or subjective assessment of the performances. Different types and natures of imprecise eval-
uations have been taken into account in the literature; in the following we provide few examples:
[24] considers a situation in which imprecise evaluations concern weights, utilities, and in some cases
also probabilities of the performances of alternatives on particular criteria and the DM provides
this information in form of inequalities; [20] considers not only imprecise weights and utilities, but
dealing with a group decision problem, it takes into account imprecise importance of the members
of the group; [1],[21] take into account imprecision of weights and utilities in a hierarchic context; [6]
takes into account imprecision regarding weights and utilities; [9] compares decision strategies taking
into account different types of imprecise information on the probabilities of states of the world; [32]
explains different ways of facing situations with imprecise information on probabilities, utilities and
evaluations with respect to considered criteria.
In this paper, we assume that imprecision regards the evaluations of alternatives with respect
to the considered criteria; this implies that performance of an alternative on a considered criterion
is not a unique number but an interval of possible values. First, we suppose that each interval
is characterized by its extreme values, that is, the worst and the best evaluations the alternative
can assume with respect to the considered criterion. For example, we could say that evaluation of
alternative a with respect to criterion g is represented by the interval [gL(a), gR(a)], to indicate that
a could have whatever evaluation between gL(a) and gR(a). Then, we will consider the case where
each interval is characterized not only by its extreme values but also by another point between them;
in this way g(a) = [gL(a), gP (a), gR(a)], and this interval indicates that, with respect to criterion
g, alternative a can assume whatever evaluation between gL(a) and gR(a) but the most probable
evaluation assumed by a is gP (a). Generalizing again, in a way of [23], we will consider intervals
characterized by their extreme values and by a certain number of other points between them, such
that for a given criterion g, we have g(a) = [g1(a), . . . , gn(a)], where gi, i = 1, . . . , n, will be called
indicators of criterion g. This means that an alternative could have any evaluation from among the
n listed points of the interval.
Obviously, if alternative a assumes the same value for all indicators of criterion gj, that is g
1
j (a) =
. . . = gnj (a), then alternative a has a precise evaluation on criterion gj being g
1
j (a).
Proceeding in this way, if m is the number of evaluation criteria, to each alternative a corresponds
a vector of m × n values, and thus, instead of aggregating m evaluations corresponding to the
m considered criteria, we have to aggregate m × n evaluations specified by the above mentioned
indicators.
In order to deal with m × n possible evaluations of alternative a, we are considering n fictitious
copies of this alternative, denoted by a(i), i = 1, . . . , n, where a(i) is an alternative having precise
evaluations on all considered criteria and, in particular, for each criterion gj this precise evaluation
is gij(a). For example, if alternative a had the following evaluations on criteria g1, g2 and g3:
g1(a) = [10, 15, 17] , g2(a) = [23, 35, 50] , and g3(a) = [1, 40, 89] ,
then, fictitious alternatives a(1), a(2) and a(3) were evaluated as shown in Table 1:
Obviously, a(1) will be the worst realization of alternative a because it has the worst possible eval-
uations on all considered criteria, and a(n) is instead the best realization of alternative a because it
has the best possible evaluations on all considered criteria.
In the ROR context, we shall consider all the value functions compatible with the preference
information provided by the DM, obtaining n2 +1 necessary and n2+1 possible preference relations
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Table 1: Evaluation table of fictitious alternatives a(1), a(2), a(3)
alternative a(i) g1
(
a(i)
)
g2
(
a(i)
)
g3
(
a(i)
)
a(1) [10,10,10] [23,23,23] [1,1,1]
a(2) [15,15,15] [35,35,35] [40,40,40]
a(3) [17,17,17] [50,50,50] [89,89,89]
defined as follows:
For any pair a, b of considered alternatives,
• the (i, k) necessary preference relation, with i, k = 1, . . . , n, for which a is (i, k)−necessarily
preferred to b if a(i) is at least as good as b(k) for all compatible value functions,
• the (i, k) possible preference relation, with i, k = 1, . . . , n, for which a is (i, k)−possibly pre-
ferred to b if a(i) is at least as good as b(k) for at least one compatible value function,
• the necessary preference relation, for which a is necessarily preferred to b if a is at least as good
as b for all compatible value functions considering all n evaluations of a and all n evaluations
of b,
• the possible preference relation, for which a is possibly preferred to b if a is at least as good
as b for at least one compatible value function considering all n evaluations of a and all n
evaluations of b.
The paper is structured in the following way: section 2 describes basic concepts of imprecise eval-
uations; in section 3 we present the application of ROR in case of imprecise evaluations; section
4 contains the properties of necessary and possible preference relations, also in case of group deci-
sions; in section 5 are present a few extensions of imprecise evaluations; section 6 contains a didactic
example, and conclusions gathered in section 7 end the paper.
2 Imprecise Evaluations - description of the model
We are considering a decision problem in which a finite set of alternatives, denoted by A = {a, b, c, . . .},
can have imprecise evaluations with respect to m evaluation criteria {g1, . . . , gm}. In case of precise
evaluations, a criterion gj , j ∈ J = {1, . . . , m}, is a function gj : A→ Xj whereXj is the set of all pos-
sible evaluations (quantitative or qualitative, depending on the evaluation scale of criterion gj) that
an alternative could have on criterion gj. In case of n-point imprecise evaluations we assume that each
criterion is a function gj : A → Ij , where Ij = {(x1, . . . , xn) : xl ≤j xl+1, l = 1, . . . , n− 1} ⊆ Xj
n,
and ≤j coincides with mathematical operator ≤ if criterion fj has a quantitative scale, however, it is
defined differently if criterion fj has a qualitative scale. To explain this different definition of ≤j , let
us consider the evaluation of a student regarding a certain subject denoted by gj , and suppose that
the evaluations (s)he can have with respect to this subject are: “very bad”, “bad”, “medium”, “good”
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and “very good”. Then, we need to define an ordering ≤j between any two of these evaluations that
is obviously different from the inequality ≤ between two real numbers, that is “very bad” ≤j “bad”
≤j “medium” ≤j “good” ≤j “very good”. Using this notation, for each a ∈ A and for each criterion
gj, j ∈ J , we say that gj(a) =
[
g1j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a)
]
, to indicate that alternative a ∈ A could assume on
criterion gj any evaluation from among g
1
j (a), g
2
j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a). Each g
i
j, j = 1, . . . , m, i = 1, . . . , n,
will be called indicator. In this context it is worth noting one important remark:
• if alternative a ∈ A has a precise evaluation on criterion gj , j ∈ J , then g
1
j (a) = . . . = g
n
j (a).
Without loss of generality, we will suppose the following:
• each criterion has a quantitative scale, therefore Xj ⊆ R, and ≥j coincides with ≥,
• for each j = 1, . . . , m, the interval gj(a) representing the evaluation of a ∈ A on criterion gj is
characterized by n points,
• the greater gij(a), a ∈ A, the better is alternative a on indicator g
i
j, j = 1, . . . , m, i = 1, . . . , n.
Considering the imprecise evaluations and the n indicators gij for each criterion gj, each alternative
a will be represented in the following way:
g(a) =
([
g11(a), . . . , g
n
1 (a)
]
, . . . ,
[
g1j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a)
]
, . . . ,
[
g1m(a), . . . , g
n
m(a)
])
.
Using this notation, we can write the following definitions:
Definition 2.1. Given alternatives a, b ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we say that “a (i, k)-dominates
b”, denoted by a∆(i,k)b, if gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (a), ∀j = 1, . . . , m.
Definition 2.2. Given alternatives a, b ∈ A, we say that “a normally dominates b”, denoted by a∆b,
if gij(a) ≥ g
i
j(b), ∀j = 1, . . . , m, and ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Equivalently we can say that “a normally dominates b” if a (i, i)-dominates b, ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
The following proposition gives some basic properties of dominance relations.
Proposition 2.1.
1. If i ≥ k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then ∆(i,k) is reflexive,
2. If i ≤ k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then ∆(i,k) is transitive,
3. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} , ∆(i,i) is a partial preorder,
4. If r ≥ i and s ≤ k, i, k, r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then ∆(i,k) ⊆ ∆(r,s),
5. Given alternatives a, b, c ∈ A, if a∆(i,k)b, b∆(i1,k1)c, and k ≥ i1, i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
a∆(r,s)c, r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
6. ∆ is a partial preorder,
7. Given alternatives a, b, c ∈ A, if a∆(i,k)b, b∆c, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a∆(s,t)c with s, t ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that s ≥ i and t ≤ k,
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8. Given alternatives a, b, c ∈ A, if a∆b, b∆(i,k)c, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a∆(s,t)c with s, t ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that s ≥ i and t ≤ k.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note 2.1. In the following, we shall call strong dominance, and we shall denote it by ∆S, the
dominance relation ∆(1,n). Similarly, we shall call weak dominance, and we shall denote it by ∆W , the
dominance relation ∆(n,1). When n = 2, that is, when each interval is characterized by its worst and
its best values only, then we only have the strong dominance relation, the normal dominance relation
and the weak dominance relation. In this case, we can compare two alternatives considering only their
best values and their worst values, or intervals of values provided by them. Using Proposition 2.1 we
can state that weak and normal dominances are reflexive relations, normal and strong dominances
are transitive relations, and so on.
Considering simultaneously the strong and the weak dominance relations we can state the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 2.2.
1. ∆(1,n) ⊆ ∆ ⊆ ∆(n,1),
2. For i, k = 1, . . . , n, ∆(1,n) ⊆ ∆(i,k) ⊆ ∆(n,1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Note 2.2. Proposition 2.2 shows how important it is to take into account the weak and the strong
dominance relations, as they are the only two relations that can be compared directly with ∆ because,
in general, for any (i, k) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n}, with (i, k) 6= (1, n) and (i, k) 6= (n, 1), we can
have ∆(i,k) 6⊆ ∆ and ∆ 6⊆ ∆(i,k).
3 Robust Ordinal Regression for Imprecise Evaluations
Considering only the dominance relations, the information stemming for the formulation of a multiple
criteria decision problem is very poor. For this reason, in order to deal with one of the three classic
decision problems (choice, ranking and sorting), we are using the Multi-attribute Utility Theory
(MAUT) [19]. MAUT considers value functions
U(g1(a), . . . , gm(a)) : R
m → R
such that: a is at least as good as b ⇔ U(g1(a), . . . , gm(a)) ≥ U(g1(b), . . . , gm(b)), taking into
account the evaluations of alternatives with respect to the considered criteria. In case of imprecise
evaluations, we consider for each criterion gj, j ∈ J, n indicators g
i
j : A→ Xj , i = 1, . . . , n, assigning
to each alternative a ∈ A the i-th evaluation from interval gj(a). Using this notation we can
distinguish different types of value functions:
• i-th sub-marginal value function with respect to the i-th indicator of criterion gj, uj,i(g
i
j(a)) :
Xj → R, for all j ∈ J , and i = 1, . . . , n,
5
• marginal value function with respect to criterion gj, Uj
([
g1j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a)
])
: Ij → R such that
Uj
([
g1j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a)
])
= uj,1
(
g1j (a)
)
+ . . .+ uj,n
(
gnj (a)
)
,
(we are considering the marginal utility of alternative a with respect to criterion gj dependent
on all the n considered indicators gij because each one of them gives a contribution to the
evaluation of a on criterion gj and this is also the reason for which we consider for each
indicator gij a different sub-marginal value function uj,i),
• total additive value function
U
([
g11(a) . . . , g
n
1 (a)
]
, . . . ,
[
g1m(a), . . . , g
n
m(a)
])
: I1 × · · · × Im → R
such that
U
([
g11(a) . . . , g
n
1 (a)
]
, . . . ,
[
g1m(a), . . . , g
n
m(a)
])
=
=
m∑
j=1
Uj
([
g1j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a)
])
=
m∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=1
uj,i
(
gij(a)
)]
In the following, for the sake of simplicity, for each j ∈ J we write Uj(a) instead of Uj
([
g1j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a)
])
,
and U(a) instead of U ([g11(a), . . . , g
n
1 (a)] , . . . , [g
1
m(a), . . . , g
n
m(a)]). In order to assign to each alterna-
tive a real number representing its degree of desirability, we need to know the sub-marginal value
functions uj,i(·), for all j ∈ J and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. They can be obtained in two different ways:
asking the decision maker (DM) what is the analytical expression of functions uj,i, or computing
them from indirect preference information elicited by the DM on a set AR ⊆ A of alternatives called
reference alternatives. The reference alternatives will be marked with a dash, like a. We propose to
use the second method, and thus the DM is asked to provide the following preference information:
• partial preorder % on AR, whose meaning is: for a, b ∈ AR
a % b ⇔ “a is at least as good as b ”;
Taking into account %, we have that %−1 denote the inverse of %, i.e. if a % b then b %−1 a;
∼ (indifference) is the symmetric part of % given by % ∩ %−1, i.e. if a ∼ b then a % b and
a %−1 b; ≻ (preference) is the asymmetric part of % given by % \ ∼, i.e. if a ≻ b then a % b
and not a ∼ b;
• partial preorder %∗ on AR × AR, whose meaning is: for a, b, c, d ∈ AR,
(a, b) %∗ (c, d)⇔ “a is preferred to b at least as much as c is preferred to d ”;
analogously to %, ≻∗ and ∼∗ are the asymmetric and the symmetric part of %∗;
• partial preorder %j on A
R, whose meaning is: for a, b ∈ AR,
a %j b⇔ “a is at least as good as b on criterion gj”;
analogously to %, ≻j and ∼j are the asymmetric and the symmetric part of %j ;
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• partial preorder %∗j on A
R × AR, whose meaning is: for a, b, c, d ∈ AR,
(a, b) %∗j (c, d)⇔ “a is preferred to b at least as much as c is preferred to d
on criterion gj”;
analogously to %, ≻∗j and ∼
∗
j are the asymmetric and the symmetric part of %
∗
j .
In order to take into account the imprecise nature of evaluations, we consider for each alternative
a ∈ A, n fictitious alternatives a(i), having precise evaluations on all criteria, equal to the i-th point
of interval gj(a), for each j ∈ J , i.e. g
1
j
(
a(i)
)
= . . . = gnj
(
a(i)
)
= gij(a), for each j ∈ J . Note that
given a ∈ A, a value function U assigns to corresponding alternatives a(i) the value:
U
(
a(i)
)
= u1,1
(
gi1(a)
)
+ . . .+ u1,n
(
gi1(a)
)
+ . . .+ um,1
(
gim(a)
)
+ . . .+ um,n
(
gim(a)
)
. (1)
An additive value function is called compatible if it is able to restore the preference information
supplied by the DM. Formally, a general additive compatible value function is an additive value
function satisfying the following set of constraints:
U(a) > U(b) if a ≻ b
U(a) = U(b) if a ∼ b
U(a)− U(b) > U(c)− U(d) if (a, b) ≻∗ (c, d)
U(a)− U(b) = U(c)− U(d) if (a, b) ∼∗ (c, d)
Uj(a) > Uj(b) if a ≻j b, j ∈ J
Uj(a) = Uj(b) if a ∼j b, j ∈ J
Uj(a)− Uj(b) > Uj(c)− Uj(d) if (a, b) ≻
∗
j (c, d), j ∈ J
Uj(a)− Uj(b) = Uj(c)− Uj(d) if (a, b) ∼
∗
j (c, d), j ∈ J


a, b, c, d ∈ AR
uj,i(x
k
j )− uj,i(x
k−1
j ) ≥ 0, for each j ∈ J, k = 1, ..., mj(A), i = 1, . . . , n
uj,i(x
1
j) = 0, ∀j ∈ J, i = 1, . . . , n∑
j∈J
i=1,...,n
uj,i
(
x
mj (A)
j
)
= 1.


(
EA
R
)
where, for each j ∈ J , x1j = min
a∈A
g1j (a), x
mj (A)
j = max
a∈A
gnj (a), x
k
j ∈ Xj(A), k = 1, ..., mj(A), with
Xj(A) =
⋃
a∈A
i=1,...,n
gij(a) ⊆ Xj , being the set of all different evaluations of alternatives from A on
criterion gj , j ∈ J , and mj(A) = |Xj(A)| . The values x
k
j , k = 1, ..., mj(A), are increasingly ordered,
i.e.,
x1j < x
2
j < ... < x
mj(A)−1
j < x
mj (A)
j .
In order to check the existence of a compatible value function, we have to weaken the strong
inequalities by adding an auxiliary variable ε, and then solve the following optimization problem,
where the variables are uj,i(x
k
j ), j ∈ J , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, k = 1, . . . , mj(A) and ε :
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Maximize ε, subject to constraints:
U(a) ≥ U(b) + ε if a ≻ b
U(a) = U(b) if a ∼ b
U(a)− U(b) ≥ U(c)− U(d) + ε if (a, b) ≻∗ (c, d)
U(a)− U(b) = U(c)− U(d) if (a, b) ∼∗ (c, d)
Uj(a) ≥ Uj(b) + ε if a ≻j b, j ∈ J
Uj(a) = Uj(b) if a ∼j b, j ∈ J
Uj(a)− Uj(b) ≥ Uj(c)− Uj(d) + ε if (a, b) ≻
∗
j (c, d), j ∈ J
Uj(a)− Uj(b) = Uj(c)− Uj(d) if (a, b) ∼
∗
j (c, d), j ∈ J


a, b, c, d ∈ AR
uj,i(x
k
j )− uj,i(x
k−1
j ) ≥ 0, for each j ∈ J, k = 1, ..., mj(A), i = 1, . . . , n
uj,i(x
1
j ) = 0, ∀j ∈ J, i = 1, . . . , n∑
j∈J
i=1,...,n
uj,i
(
x
mj(A)
j
)
= 1.


(
EA
R′
)
If ε
(
EA
R′
)
> 0, where ε
(
EA
R′
)
= max ε, s.t. constraints
(
EA
R′
)
, then there exists at least one
compatible value function U(·); if instead, ε
(
EA
R′
)
≤ 0, then there does not exist any compatible
value function U(·). Supposing that there exist more than one compatible value function, we indicate
by U the set of all compatible value functions; in general, each of these functions will induce a
different ranking on the set A of alternatives. For this reason, Robust Ordinal Regression methods
(see [13],[8],[15],[12],[18],[2]), do not take into account only one compatible value function but the
whole set of compatible value functions simultaneously.
Taking into account the imprecise nature of evaluations, and considering for each alternative
a ∈ A the fictitious alternatives a(i), i = 1, . . . , n, we can define the following preference relations:
Definition 3.1. Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A and the set U of compatible value functions on
AR ⊆ A, we say that a is possibly preferred to b, if a is at least as good as b for at least one
compatible value function:
a %P b⇔ there exists U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(b).
Definition 3.2. Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A and the set U of compatible value functions on
AR ⊆ A, we say that a is necessarily preferred to b, if a is at least as good as b for all compatible
value functions:
a %N b⇔ U(a) ≥ U(b), for all U ∈ U .
Definition 3.3. Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A, the set U of compatible value functions on AR ⊆ A,
and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we say that a is (i, k)-possibly preferred to b, if a(i) is at least as good as b(k)
for at least one compatible value function:
a %P(i,k) b⇔ there exists U ∈ U : U
(
a(i)
)
≥ U
(
b(k)
)
.
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Definition 3.4. Given two alternatives a, b ∈ A, the set U of compatible value functions on AR ⊆ A,
and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we say that a is (i, k)−necessarily preferred to b, if a(i) is at least as good as
b(k) for all compatible value functions:
a %N(i,k) b⇔ U
(
a(i)
)
≥ U
(
b(k)
)
, for all U ∈ U .
For all a, b ∈ A, and for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let us consider the following sets of constraints:
U(a) ≥ U(b)
EA
R′
}(
EP (a, b)
)
,
U(b) ≥ U(a) + ε
EA
R′
}(
EN(a, b)
)
,
U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(k))
EA
R′
}(
EP(i,k)(a, b)
)
,
U(b(k)) ≥ U(a(i)) + ε
EA
R′
}(
EN(i,k)(a, b)
)
.
then:
• a %P b if EP (a, b) is feasible and εP (a, b) > 0, where εP (a, b) = max ε, s.t. constraints
EP (a, b),
• a %N b if EN(a, b) is infeasible or εN(a, b) ≤ 0, where εN(a, b) = max ε, s.t. constraints
EN(a, b),
• a %P(i,k) b if E
P
(i,k)(a, b) is feasible and ε
P
(i,k)(a, b) > 0, where ε
P
(i,k)(a, b) = max ε, s.t. constraints
EP(i,k)(a, b),
• a %N(i,k) b if E
N
(i,k)(a, b) is infeasible or ε
N
(i,k)(a, b) ≤ 0, where ε
N
(i,k)(a, b) = max ε, s.t. constraints
EN(i,k)(a, b).
4 Properties of necessary and possible preference relations
The necessary and possible preference relations satisfy several interesting properties presented in the
following propositions.
Proposition 4.1.
1. For each a ∈ A, if i ≥ k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then U(a(i)) ≥ U(a(k)),
2. For each a ∈ A, U(a(1)) ≤ U(a) ≤ U(a(n)),
3. %N ⊆ %P ,
4. For all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, %N(i,k) ⊆ %
P
(i,k),
5. %N is a partial preorder, i.e. a reflexive and transitive binary relation,
6. %P is strongly complete and negatively transitive,
7. For all a, b ∈ A, a %N b or b %P a,
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8. ∆ ⊆ %N ,
9. Given a, b, c ∈ A such that a %N b and b %P c, then a %P c,
10. Given a, b, c ∈ A such that a %P b and b %N c, then a %P c,
11. Given a, b, c ∈ A such that a∆b and b %N c, then a %N c,
12. Given a, b, c ∈ A such that a %N b and b∆c, then a %N c,
13. Given a, b, c ∈ A such that a∆b and b %P c, then a %P c,
14. Given a, b, c ∈ A such that a %P b and b∆c, then a %P c,
15. For all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∆(i,k) ⊆ %N(i,k),
16. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N(i,n) b, b %
N c and r ≥ i, then a %N(r,1) c,
17. Given a, b, c ∈ A, k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N b, b %N(1,k) c and r ≤ k, then a %
N
(n,r) c,
18. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %P(i,n) b, b %
N c and r ≥ i, then a %P(r,1) c,
19. Given a, b, c ∈ A, k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N b, b %P(1,k) c and r ≤ k, then a %
P
(n,r) c,
20. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N(i,n) b, b %
P c and r ≥ i, then a %P(r,1) c,
21. Given a, b, c ∈ A, k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %P b, b %N(1,k) c and r ≤ k, then a %
P
(n,r) c,
22. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a∆(i,n)b, b %N c and r ≥ i, then a %N(r,1) c,
23. Given a, b, c ∈ A, k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N b, b∆(1,k)c and r ≤ k, then a %N(n,r) c,
24. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a∆(i,n)b, b %P c and r ≥ i, then a %P(r,1) c,
25. Given a, b, c ∈ A, k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %P b, b∆(1,k)c and r ≤ k, then a %P(n,r) c,
26. Given a, b, c ∈ A, k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a∆b, b %N(1,k) c and r ≤ k, then a %
N
(n,r) c,
27. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N(i,n) b, b∆c and r ≥ i, then a %
N
(r,1) c,
28. Given a, b, c ∈ A, k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a∆b, b %P(1,k) c and r ≤ k, then a %
P
(n,r) c,
29. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %P(i,n) b, b∆c and r ≥ i, then a %
P
(r,1) c,
30. If i ≥ k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then %N(i,k) is reflexive,
31. If i ≤ k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then %N(i,k) is transitive,
32. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, %N(i,i) is a partial preorder,
33. For all a, b ∈ A, for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have a %N(i,k) b or b %
P
(k,i) a,
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34. If i ≥ k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then %P(i,k) is strongly complete and negatively transitive,
35. If i1 ≥ i and k1 ≤ k, i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then %
N
(i,k) ⊆ %
N
(i1,k1)
,
36. If i1 ≥ i and k1 ≤ k, i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then %
P
(i,k) ⊆ %
P
(i1,k1)
,
37. For all i, k = 1, . . . , n, %N(1,n) ⊆ %
N
(i,k) ⊆ %
N
(n,1),
38. For all i, k = 1, . . . , n, %P(1,n) ⊆ %
P
(i,k) ⊆ %
P
(n,1),
39. %N(1,n) ⊆ %
N ⊆ %N(n,1),
40. %P(1,n) ⊆ %
P ⊆ %P(n,1),
41. If a %N(i,k) b, b %
N
(i1,k1)
c, and k ≥ i1, with i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a %
N
(r,s) c, where
r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
42. If a %N(i,k) b, b %
P
(i1,k1)
c, and k ≥ i1, with i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a %
P
(r,s) c, where
r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
43. If a %P(i,k) b, b %
N
(i1,k1)
c, and k ≥ i1, with i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a %
P
(r,s) c, where
r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
44. If a∆(i,k)b, b %N(i1,k1) c, and k ≥ i1, with i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a %
N
(r,s) c, where r, s ∈
{1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
45. If a %N(i,k) b, b∆
(i1,k1)c, and k ≥ i1, with i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a %
N
(r,s) c, where r, s ∈
{1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
46. If a∆(i,k)b, b %P(i1,k1) c, and k ≥ i1, with i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a %
P
(r,s) c, where r, s ∈
{1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
47. If a %P(i,k) b, b∆
(i1,k1)c, and k ≥ i1, with i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a %
P
(r,s) c, where r, s ∈
{1, . . . , n} : r ≥ i and s ≤ k1,
Proof. See appendix.
Note 4.1. Later, we will also use the following notation:
• “strongly necessary preference relation”, to indicate the necessary preference relation %N(1,n)
(denoted by %SN),
• “strongly possible preference relation”, to indicate the possible preference relation %P(1,n) (denoted
by %SP ),
• “weakly necessary preference relation”, to indicate the necessary preference relation %N(n,1) (de-
noted by %WN), and
• “weakly possible preference relation”, to indicate the possible preference relation %P(n,1) (denoted
by %WP ).
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In case of n = 2-point intervals, the only preference relations we can consider are the four preference
relations cited above, as well as the necessary and possible preference relations from Definitions (3.1)
and (3.2).
Considering the weak, normal and strong dominance relations, together with weak, normal and
strong preference relations as a straightforward consequence of Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 2.2
we obtain the set of dependencies shown in Figure 1:
Proposition 4.2. Implications in Figure 1 hold.
Figure 1: Dependencies between all kinds of dominance relations and preference relations
∆S ⇒ ∆ ⇒ ∆W
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
%SN ⇒ %N ⇒ %WN
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
%SP ⇒ %P ⇒ %WP
Moreover:
1. a %SN b and b %N c ⇒ a %N c,
2. a %SN b and b %P c ⇒ a %P c,
3. a %N b and b %SN c ⇒ a %N c,
4. a %N b and b %SP c ⇒ a %P c,
5. a %SP b and b %N c ⇒ a %P c,
6. a %P b and b %SN c ⇒ a %P c,
7. a %N b or b %P a,
8. a %SN b or b %WP a,
9. a %WN b or b %SP a,
10. a∆Sb and b∆c ⇒ a∆Sc,
11. a∆Sb and b∆W c ⇒ a∆W c,
12. a∆Sb and b %SN c ⇒ a %SN c,
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13. a∆Sb and b %N c ⇒ a %N c,
14. a∆Sb and b %WN c ⇒ a %WN c,
15. a∆Sb and b %SP c ⇒ a %SP c,
16. a∆Sb and b %P c ⇒ a %P c,
17. a∆Sb and b %WP c ⇒ a %WP c,
18. a∆b and b∆Sc ⇒ a∆Sc,
19. a∆b and b∆W c ⇒ a∆W c,
20. a∆b and b %SN c ⇒ a %N c,
21. a∆b and b %SP c ⇒ a %P c,
22. a∆W b and b∆c ⇒ a∆W c,
23. a∆W b and b %SN c ⇒ a∆WNc,
24. a∆W b and b %SP c ⇒ a %WP c,
25. a %SN b and b∆Sc ⇒ a %SN c,
26. a %SN b and b∆c ⇒ a %N c,
27. a %SN b and b∆W c ⇒ a %WN c,
28. a %SN b and b %WN c ⇒ a %WN c,
29. a %SN b and b %SP c ⇒ a %SP c,
30. a %SN b and b %WP c ⇒ a %WP c,
31. a %N b and b∆Sc ⇒ a %N c,
32. a %WN b and b∆Sc ⇒ a %WN c,
33. a %WN b and b %SN c ⇒ a %WN c,
34. a %WN b and b %SP c ⇒ a %WP c,
35. a %SP b and b∆Sc ⇒ a %SP c,
36. a %SP b and b∆c ⇒ a %P c,
37. a %SP b and b∆W c ⇒ a %WP c,
38. a %SP b and b %SN c ⇒ a %SP c,
39. a %SP b and b %WN c ⇒ a %WP c,
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40. a %P b and b∆Sc ⇒ a %P c,
41. a %WP b and b∆Sc ⇒ a %WP c,
42. a %WP b and b %SN c ⇒ a %WP c.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.1 Group Decisions
In many decision making problems, there are more than one DM. For example, in case of decisions
related to land development, a group of stakeholders with different perceptions of predefined criteria
has to be involved. Robust Ordinal Regression ([14, 11]) has been applied to group decisions as
follows. Considering a set DM of DMs, and a set of pairwise comparisons provided by the DMs
belonging to D
′
⊆ DM, for each dh ∈ D
′
we compute the necessary and possible preference relations
%Nh and %
P
h . Then, we can represent consensus between decision makers from DM, defining the
following preference relations for all D′ ⊆ DM:
• the necessary-necessary preference relation (%N,N
D
′ ), for which a is necessarily preferred to b for
all dh ∈ D
′
,
• the necessary-possible preference relation (%N,P
D
′ ), for which a is necessarily preferred to b for
at least one dh ∈ D
′
,
• the possible-necessary preference relation (%P,N
D
′ ), for which a is possibly preferred to b for all
dh ∈ D
′
,
• the possible-possible preference relation (%P,P
D
′ ), for which a is possibly preferred to b for at
least one dh ∈ D
′
.
The above preference relations %N,N
D
′ , %
N,P
D
′ , %
P,N
D
′ and %
P,P
D
′ , extensively discussed in [11], satisfy
some interesting properties, as for example:
• %N,N
D
′ ⊆ %
N,P
D
′ ⊆ %
P,P
D
′ ,
• %N,N
D
′ ⊆ %
P,N
D
′ ⊆ %
P,P
D
′
In case of n-point imprecise evaluations, we can extend the number of preference relations con-
sidered in group decisions, giving the following definition:
Definition 4.1. For all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and for all a, b ∈ A :
• a %N,N
(i,k),D′
b if a is (i, k)-necessarily preferred to b for all DMs dh ∈ D
′
,
• a %N,P
(i,k),D′
b if a is (i, k)-necessarily preferred to b for at least one DM dh ∈ D
′
,
• a %P,N
(i,k),D
′ b if a is (i, k)-possibly preferred to b for all DMs dh ∈ D
′
,
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• a %P,P
(i,k),D′
b if a is (i, k)-possibly preferred to b for at least one DM dh ∈ D
′
.
Note 4.2. Analogously to the case of a single DM, we can state the following equalities:
• %N,N
(1,n),D′
=%SN,N
D
′ , %
N,P
(1,n),D′
=%SN,P
D
′ , %
P,N
(1,n),D′
=%SP,N
D
′ , %
P,P
(1,n),D′
=%SP,P
D
′ ,
• %N,N
(n,1),D′
=%WN,N
D
′ , %
N,P
(n,1),D′
=%WN,N
D
′ , %
P,N
(n,1),D′
=%WP,N
D
′ , %
P,P
(n,1),D′
=%WP,P
D
′ .
In the case of n-point imprecise evaluations we can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3. Given i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, D
′
⊆ D and R1, R2, R
′
1, R
′
2 ∈ {P,N} such that:
• i1 ≥ i and k1 ≤ k,
• %R1(i,k) ⊆ %
R
′
1
(i,k),
then
%R1,R2
(i,k),D
′ ⊆ %
R
′
1
,R
′
2
(i1,k1),D
′ where R
′
2 =


N or P if R2 = N
P if R2 = P.
Proof. See Appendix.
For example, considering a 2-point interval decomposition and supposing that a %N,N
(1,1),D′
b holds,
using this proposition we obtain: a %P,N
(1,1),D′
b, a %N,P
(1,1),D′
b, a %P,P
(1,1),D′
b, a %N,N
(2,1),D′
b, a %P,N
(2,1),D′
b,
a %
N,P
(2,1),D′
b and a %P,P
(2,1),D′
b.
Joining the weak, the strong and the normal preference relations in case of group decisions, we
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4.4. For any R1 ∈ {P,N} , and for any D
′
⊆ D :
1. %SN,R1
D
′ ⊆ %
N,R1
D
′ ⊆ %
WN,R1
D
′ ,
2. %SP,R1
D
′ ⊆ %
P,R1
D
′ ⊆ %
WP,R1
D
′ .
Proof. See Appendix.
Considering together results of Propositions 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4, we obtain the dependencies presented
in Figure 2.
We have seen in Proposition 4.1 that for all a, b ∈ A the following completeness property holds:
a %N(i,k) b or b %
P
(k,i) a, with i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
In case of group decisions, the two following completeness properties hold:
Proposition 4.5. For all a, b ∈ A, and for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have:
1. a %N,N
(i,k),D′
b or b %P,P
(k,i),D′
a,
2. a %N,P
(i,k),D
′ b or b %
P,N
(k,i),D
′ a.
15
Figure 2: Group preference relations in case of imprecise evaluations
Proof. See Appendix.
For example, in Figure 2 we observe the following completeness properties, for all a, b ∈ A:
• a %SN,N
D
′ b or b %
WP,P
D
′ a,
• a %N,N
D
′ b or b %
P,P
D
′ a,
• a %WN,N
D
′ b or b %
SP,P
D
′ a,
• a %SN,P
D
′ b or b %
WP,N
D
′ a,
• a %N,P
D
′ b or b %
P,N
D
′ a,
• a %WN,P
D
′ b or b %
SP,N
D
′ a.
Proposition 4.6. Given a, b, c ∈ A, i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, R1, R2 ∈ {P,N} and D
′
⊆ D such that
k ≥ i1:
1. if a %N,R1
(i,k),D′
b, b %
N,R2
(i1,k1),D
′ c, then a %
N,R
(r,s),D′
c,
2. if a %N,R1
(i,k),D′
b, b %P,R2
(i1,k1),D
′ c, then a %
P,R
(r,s),D′
c,
3. if a %P,R1
(i,k),D′
b, b %N,R2
(i1,k1),D
′ c, then a %
P,R
(r,s),D′
c,
where r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that r ≥ i, s ≤ k1 and R =
{
R1 if R1 = R2 = N,
P if R1 6= R2.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Let us note that in the above proposition, the property of transitivity does not hold when the two
relations in the condition part are possibly true for at least one DM, i.e. when a %R1(i,k) b is true for
at least one DM and b %R1(i1,k1) c is true for at least one DM. In fact, in this case, we cannot conclude
that there exists at least one DM for whom a %R1(i,k) c, because the DMs of the first and of the second
relations could be different.
5 Further extensions of ROR in case of imprecise evalua-
tions
Inconsistency
We have seen in section 3, that the first step of ROR is to check if there exists at least one value
function compatible with the preference information provided by the DM. In fact, it is possible that
the information provided by the DM has some inconsistencies that do not permit to find a compatible
value function. In this case, the DM, together with the analyst, can decide to continue the study while
accepting the existence of these inconsistencies, or look for a minimal set of constraints responsible for
this infeasibility, and remove them from the linear program. The procedures used to find a minimal
set of constraints responsible for the infeasibility can be found in [22].
Credibility
ROR methods permit to elicit incrementally the preferences by the DM, assigning them a different
degree of credibility. The idea of considering a sequence of preference information pieces ordered
according to their credibility has been introduced in [13]. More formally, the preference information
given by the DM is represented by a chain of embedded preference relations %1⊆ . . . ⊆%h, where for
all r, s = 1, . . . , h, with r < s, the preference %r is more credible than %s. If for any t = 1, . . . , h,
we denote by Et the set of constraints obtained from %t, and by Ut the sets of value functions
compatible with the preference information of %t, then we have E1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Eh and U1 ⊇ . . . ⊇ Uh,
and consequently %N1 ⊆ . . . ⊆%
N
h , and %
P
1 ⊇ . . . ⊇%
P
h , that is the smaller the credibility of the
considered preference relation %t, the richer the necessary preference relation %
N
t and the poorer the
possible preference relation %Pt . In case of imprecise evaluations, considering the same Et and Ut,
we will have for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, %N(i,k),1⊆ . . . ⊆%
N
(i,k),h, and %
P
(i,k),1⊇ . . . ⊇%
P
(i,k),h, which means
that also in this case the smaller the credibility of the considered preference relation %t, the richer
the necessary preference relation %N(i,k),t, and the poorer the possible preference relation %
P
(i,k),t .
Extreme ranking analysis
Necessary and possible preference relations give information regarding pairs of alternatives. However,
it is also interesting to analyse information related to the whole set of alternatives in terms of the best
and the worst ranking position assigned to each alternative by the compatible value functions. This
constitutes the extreme ranking analysis introduced in [18]. In case of n-point imprecise evaluations,
the extreme ranking analysis can be performed for each preference relation considered. That is, for
all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} we could find a ranking using the necessary preference relation %N(i,k) and the
possible preference relation %P(i,k).
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Sorting problem
Ranking and choice problems are based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives and therefore they can
be dealt with possible and necessary preference relations. Sorting relies instead on the alternative’s
intrinsic value and not on the comparison to others. Therefore, sorting problems need specific
methods. Within ROR, UTADISGMS [15] has been proposed to deal with sorting problem as follows.
Given a set of pre-defined classes C1, C2, . . . , Cp ordered from the worst to the best, the DM gives
preference information in terms of exemplary assignments of reference alternatives to intervals of
considered classes, such that a∗ → [CLDM (a∗), CRDM (a∗)], with L
DM ≤ RDM , means that reference
alternative a∗ can be assigned to one of the classes between CLDM (a∗) and CRDM (a∗). Denoting by
AR ⊆ A the set of reference alternatives assigned by the DM, we say that a value function U is
compatible if
∀a∗, b∗ ∈ A
R, LDM(a∗) > R
DM(b∗)⇒ U(a∗) > U(b∗). (2)
Denoting by U the set of compatible value functions, we have that each U ∈ U assigns an
alternative a ∈ A to an interval of classes
[
LU (a), RU(a)
]
where
LU (a) = max
(
{1} ∪
{
LDM(a∗) : U(a∗) ≤ U(a), a∗ ∈ A
R
})
,
RU(a) = min
(
{p} ∪
{
RDM(a∗) : U(a∗) ≥ U(a), a∗ ∈ A
R
})
.
Within ROR, considering the whole set of compatible value functions, for each a ∈ A one can
define the possible assignment CP (a) and the necessary assignment CN(a) as follows:
• CP (a) =
[
LUP (a), R
U
P (a)
]
=
⋃
U∈U
[
LU (a), RU(a)
]
,
• CN(a) =
[
LUN(a), R
U
N (a)
]
=
⋂
U∈U
[
LU(a), RU(a)
]
.
In case of imprecise evaluations, for each compatible value function U ∈ U , and for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
we consider:
LU(i,k)(a) = max
(
{1} ∪
{
LDM (a∗) : U(a
(i)) ≥ U(a(k)∗ ), a∗ ∈ A
R
})
RU(i,k)(a) = min
(
{p} ∪
{
RDM(a∗) : U(a
(i)) ≤ U(a(k)∗ ), a∗ ∈ A
R
})
.
• CP(i,k)(a) =
[
LU(i,k)(a), R
U
(i,k)(a)
]
=
⋃
U∈U
[
LU(i,k)(a), R
U
(i,k)(a)
]
,
• CN(i,k)(a) =
[
LU(i,k)(a), R
U
(i,k)(a)
]
=
⋂
U∈U
[
LU(i,k)(a), R
U
(i,k)(a)
]
.
In this way, we can check to which classes each alternative a can be assigned for each couple (i, k),
where i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Interacting criteria
UTAGMS, UTADISGMS and GRIP use an additive value function as preference model. This model
is among the most popular ones because it has the advantage of being easily manageable, and,
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moreover, it has a very sound axiomatic basis (see, e.g., [19, 31]). However, the additive value
function is not able to represent interactions among criteria. For example, consider evaluation of
cars using such criteria as maximum speed, acceleration and price. In this case, there may exist a
negative interaction (negative synergy) between maximum speed and acceleration because a car with
a high maximum speed also has a good acceleration, so, even if each of these two criteria is very
important for a DM who likes sport cars, their joint impact on reinforcement of preference of a more
speedy and better accelerating car over a less speedy and worse accelerating car will be smaller than
a simple addition of the two impacts corresponding to each of the two criteria considered separately
in validation of this preference relation. In the same decision problem, there may exist a positive
interaction (positive synergy) between maximum speed and price because a car with a high maximum
speed usually also has a high price, and thus a car with a high maximum speed and relatively low
price is very much appreciated. Thus, the comprehensive impact of these two criteria on the strength
of preference of a more speedy and cheaper car over a less speedy and more expensive car is greater
than the impact of the two criteria considered separately in validation of this preference relation.
To handle the interactions among criteria, one can consider non-additive integrals, such as Choquet
integral [4] and Sugeno integral [30] (for a comprehensive survey on the use of non-additive integrals
in MCDA see [10]). Robust ordinal regression has also been applied to the Choquet integral [2]. The
non-additive integrals suffer, however, from limitations within MCDA (see [28, 27]); in particular,
they need that the evaluations of alternatives on all criteria are expressed on the same scale. This
means that in order to apply a non-additive integral it is necessary, for example, to estimate if the
maximum speed of 200 km/h is worth the price of 35,000e. To deal with this problem a new robust
ordinal regression method has been proposed: UTAGMS–INT [13]. The preference model used by
UTAGMS–INT is a general additive value function augmented by two components corresponding to
“bonus” and “penalty” values for pairs of positively or negatively interacting criteria, respectively.
When calculating the value of a particular alternative, a bonus is added to the additive component of
the value function if a given pair of criteria is in a positive synergy for evaluations of this alternative
on the two criteria, or the penalty is subtracted from the additive component of the value function if
a given pair of criteria is in a negative synergy for evaluations of this alternative on the two criteria.
The specific formulation of the value function in UTAGMS–INT permits to deal with criteria having
heterogeneous scales, without encoding evaluations of alternatives on a common scale.
Methodological extensions
In this paper we have shown how to compute for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and for each pair of alternatives
a, b ∈ A, the dominance relation a∆(i,k)b and the preference relation a %(i,k) b, using the same i-th
indicator for all criteria when considering alternative a, and the same k-th indicator for all criteria
when considering alternative b. A possible extension of the described method, could consist in taking
into account different indicators for each criterion; for example, one could consider for each alternative
indicator gij for criterion gj , indicator g
k
h for criterion gh, and so on, defining other dominance and
preference relations, as well as other fictitious alternatives involving evaluations on the selected
indicators. For example, let us suppose that evaluations of alternatives a and b are as shown in Table
2:
In this case, if one would like to consider dominance and preference relations with respect to indicator
g
(3)
1 for criterion g1, indicator g
(1)
2 for criterion g2 and indicator g
(2)
3 for criterion g3, then the fictitious
alternatives a and b would get evaluations as shown in Table 3:
Another meaningful extension regards missing evaluations. For example, supposing that alternative
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Table 2: Evaluation table of alternatives a and b
alternative g1(·) g2(·) g3(·)
a [10,15,17] [25,40,50] [23,47,56]
b [11,23,45] [5,20,65] [2,82,90]
Table 3: Evaluation table of fictitious alternatives a and b
alternative g1(·) g2(·) g3(·)
a [17,17,17] [25,25,25] [47,47,47]
b [45,45,45] [5,5,5] [82,82,82]
a has missing evaluations on criterion g, one can consider for this criterion a 2-point interval g(a) =
[αg, βg], where αg and βg are respectively the worst and the best values an alternative could have
on criterion g. In this context, we could only consider the weak and the strong dominance and
preference relations, reducing also the other criteria to 2-point intervals. For example, suppose that
evaluations of alternatives a and b are as shown in Table 4:
Table 4: Evaluation table of alternatives a and b in case of missing evaluations
alternative g1(·) g2(·) g3(·)
a [10,15,17] [25,40,50] ·
b [11,23,45] · [2,82,90]
Alternative a miss evaluation on criterion g3, and b miss evaluation on criterion g2. In this case,
supposing that the range of evaluations on criterion g2 is [10, 70], while the range of evaluations on
criterion g3 is [1, 100], we will consider the fictitious alternatives a
(W ), a(B), b(W ) and b(B) represent-
ing the worst and the best realizations of alternatives a and b respectively, having 2-point interval
evaluations as shown in Table 5:
Consequently, all known evaluations of a and b, which are characterized by 3-point intervals, are
reduced to 2-point intervals when we consider the weak and the strong dominance and preference
relations for the pair (a, b).
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Table 5: Evaluation table of fictitious alternatives a(W ), a(B), b(W ), b(B)
alternative g1(·) g2(·) g3(·)
a(W ) [10,10] [25,25] [1,1]
a(B) [17,17] [50,50] [100,100]
b(W ) [11,11] [10,10] [2,2]
b(B) [45,45] [70,70] [90,90]
6 A didactic example
In this didactic example, for the sake of simplicity, we consider only the “classic” preference relations
%N and %P , the “strong” preference relations %SN and %SP and the “weak” preference relations
%WN and %WP . Let us suppose a High School has to give a scholarship; for this reason, the Dean has
to choose a laureate among 10 students being the best in particular classes of the school. In order to
cope with this problem, the Dean decides to use a multicriteria approach, considering each student
evaluated on three subjects: Mathematics (Mat), Physics (Phy) and Computer Science (Com). Each
subject is thus an evaluation criterion with an ordinal scale constituted from five levels ordered from
the worst to the best: “Very Bad, Bad, Medium, Good and Very Good.” Differently from the last
years, the Dean has a new problem, because some students have imprecise evaluations on some
criteria. The students’ evaluations are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Evaluations of students on three criteria
student\subject Mat Phy Com
A Medium Very Good Very Good
B [Good,Very Good] [Very Bad,Medium] [Bad,Good]
C [Bad,Very Good] Good [Medium,Good]
D [Good,Very Good] [Medium,Good] [Medium,Good]
E Very Good [Very Bad,Good] [Medium,Good]
F [Very Bad,Good] [Bad,Medium] [Bad,Medium]
H [Medium,Good] [Medium,Good] [Medium,Good]
I Very Good [Medium,Very Good] Bad
L [Very Bad,Bad] [Bad,Medium] [Very Bad,Medium]
M [Very Bad,Bad] [Good,Very Good] Very Good
In Table 6, we see that A is the only alternative having precise evaluations on all criteria, while
all other alternatives have imprecise evaluations; for example Mat(F)=[Very Bad,Good] means that
alternative B can assume the following evaluations “Very Bad, Bad, Medium and Good” on Math-
ematics, that is the only evaluation he certainly will not have is “Very Good.” From Table 6 and
Definition 2.1, we obtain Figures 3, 4 and 5 showing the weak, normal and strong dominance relations,
respectively.
The Dean provides, moreover, preference information regarding few alternatives he is confident
on.
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Figure 3: Weak dominance relation in the set of students
Figure 4: Classic dominance relation in the set of students
• At first, he says that “student M is preferred to student D”; this information is translated
into the constraint U(M) > U(D) that we shall call C1; adding C1 to the linear programming
constraints
(
EA
R′
)
, and after solving the corresponding optimization problems, we obtain
preference relations shown in Figures 6 and 7; in these Figures, thick red arrows represent new
information.
• Then, the Dean gives information expressing intensities of preference: “Student M is preferred
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Figure 5: Strong dominance relation in the set of students
Figure 6: Classic necessary preference relation obtained for the first piece of preference information
Figure 7: Strong necessary preference relation obtained for the first piece of preference information
to student I more than student C is preferred to student H”; adding the constraint U(M) −
U(I) > U(C)−U(H) (that we shall call C2) to the linear programming constraints
(
EA
R′
)
and
23
C1, and solving the corresponding optimization problems, we obtain the preference relations
shown in Figures 8 and 9.
Figure 8: Classic necessary preference relation obtained for the second piece of preference information
Figure 9: Strong necessary preference relation obtained for the second piece of preference information
• Finally, the Dean expresses an indifference relation: “Student C and studentM are indifferent;”
adding the constraint U(C) = U(M) to the linear programming constraints constituted by(
EA
R′
)
, C1 and C2, and solving the corresponding optimization problems, we obtain Figure
10.
At this stage, looking at the classic necessary preference relation, the Dean could conclude that,
given his preferences, the best candidates for the scholarship are students A and E.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we dealt with one of the most important issues of MCDA, that is the imprecise evalua-
tions of alternatives. The possible sources of this imprecision are, for example, lack of data, imprecise
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Figure 10: Classic necessary preference relation obtained for the third piece of preference information
measurement or intangible criteria. Many authors have studied different types of imprecision regard-
ing weights of criteria, utility functions or probabilities about the different states of the world. In
our approach, we are considering alternatives having imprecise evaluations on particular criteria,
i.e., regarding criterion gj , alternative a has an evaluation in the n-point interval
[
g1j (a), . . . , g
n
j (a)
]
,
where gij is called indicator. In this way, if m is the number of evaluation criteria, each alternative
is represented by n × m values corresponding to the different evaluations obtained by the alterna-
tive from the above indicators. In order to take into account these imprecise evaluations, first we
have considered for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} one dominance relation ∆(i,k) for which a∆(i,k)b if the value
obtained by a from the i-th indicator is at least as good as the value obtained by b from the k-th
indicator for each criterion gj. In order to compare the alternatives having imprecise evaluations,
we have used an additive value function obtained by adding up n × m marginal value functions,
one for each considered indicator. For each alternative a ∈ A and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
considered a fictitious alternative a(i) having precise evaluations on the considered criteria, equal to
the performance of a with respect to each of the i-th indicators, i.e. gkj (a
(i)) = gij(a), k = 1, . . . , n,
and j = 1, . . . , m. Using this information, in the ROR context, we have built two binary preference
relations, one necessary and one possible, for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
• alternative a is (i, k)-possibly preferred to alternative b if a(i) is at least as good as b(k) for at
least one compatible value function,
• alternative a is (i, k)-necessarily preferred to alternative b if a(i) is at least as good as b(k) for
all compatible value functions.
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We have also presented a generalization of these preference relations in case of group decisions,
showing several properties that hold in this particular case. When presenting the methodology for
dealing with imprecise evaluations, we have supposed that criteria are characterized by n-intervals,
where, for the sake of simplicity, n is equal for all criteria, but in the section devoted to generalizations,
we also explained how to proceed in case n depends on the considered criteria, and in case of missing
evaluations.
Remark, finally, that n-point imprecise evaluations can be considered as a particular case of the
hierarchy of criteria, which has been studied in [5]. In fact, the evaluation of alternative a on criterion
gj depends on the evaluations of a on the n indicators g
i
j that could be considered as subcriteria
descending from criterion gj and situated at the level below.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
1. Let a ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that i ≥ k; this implies that gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (a), ∀j = 1, . . . , m,
and thus a∆(i,k)a. Therefore ∆(i,k) is reflexive.
2. Let us suppose that a, b, c ∈ A such that a∆(i,k)b, b∆(i,k)c and i ≤ k with i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n};

a∆(i,k)b ⇔ gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (b), ∀j ∈ J,
b∆(i,k)c ⇔ gij(b) ≥ g
k
j (c), ∀j ∈ J,
⇒
being i ≤ k and combining with above expressions, we have:
gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (b) ≥ g
i
j(b) ≥ g
k
j (c), ∀j = 1, . . . , m⇒ g
i
j(a) ≥ g
k
j (c), ∀j ∈ J ⇔ a∆
(i,k)c.
Thus ∆(i,k) is transitive.
3. It follows by points 1 and 2 of this Proposition.
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4. Let be a, b ∈ A and i, k, r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a∆(i,k)b, r ≥ i and k ≥ s. Then

a∆(i,k)b ⇔ gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (b), ∀j ∈ J,
r ≥ i ⇔ grj (a) ≥ g
i
j(a), ∀j ∈ J,
k ≥ s ⇔ gkj (b) ≥ g
s
j (b), ∀j ∈ J.
From this it follows that:
grj (a) ≥ g
i
j(a) ≥ g
k
j (b) ≥ g
s
j (b), ∀j ∈ J ⇒ g
r
j (a) ≥ g
s
j (b), ∀j ∈ J ⇔ a∆
(r,s)b.
5. Let be a, b, c ∈ A, and i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a∆
(i,k)b, b∆(i1,k1)c and k ≥ i1. Then we
have: 

a∆(i,k)b ⇔ gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (b), ∀j ∈ J,
b∆(i1,k1)c ⇔ gi1j (b) ≥ g
k1
j (c), ∀j ∈ J,
k ≥ i1 ⇔ g
k
j (b) ≥ g
i1
j (b), ∀j ∈ J.
From this it follows that:
gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (b) ≥ g
i1
j (b) ≥ g
k1
j (c), ∀j ∈ J ⇒ g
i
j(a) ≥ g
k1
j (c), ∀j ∈ J ⇔ a∆
(i,k1)c.
By point 4 of Proposition 2.1, if r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that r ≥ i and s ≤ k1 then a∆
(r,s)c.
6. We have said that ∆ = ∩ni=1∆
(i,i); being ∆(i,i) a partial preorder for point 3 of this Proposition,
and being the intersection of partial preorders a partial preoder, then ∆ is a partial preorder.
7. Let be a, b, c ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that a∆(i,k)b, b∆c, s ≥ i and k ≥ t. Then we
have: 

a∆(i,k)b ⇔ gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (b), ∀j ∈ J,
b∆c ⇔ grj (b) ≥ g
r
j (c), ∀j ∈ J, ∀r = 1, . . . , n,
s ≥ i ⇔ gsj (a) ≥ g
i
j(a), ∀j ∈ J,
k ≥ t ⇔ gkj (c) ≥ g
t
j(c), ∀j ∈ J,
From this it follows that:
gsj (a) ≥ g
i
j(a) ≥ g
k
j (b) ≥ g
k
j (c) ≥ g
t
j(c), ∀j ∈ J ⇒ g
s
j (a) ≥ g
t
j(c), ∀j ∈ J ⇔ a∆
(s,t)c.
8. Let be a, b, c ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that a∆b, b∆(i,k)c, s ≥ i and k ≥ t. Then we
have: 

a∆b ⇔ grj (a) ≥ g
r
j (b), ∀j ∈ J, ∀r = 1, . . . , n,
b∆(i,k)c ⇔ gij(b) ≥ g
k
j (c), ∀j ∈ J,
s ≥ i ⇔ gsj (a) ≥ g
i
j(a), ∀j ∈ J,
k ≥ t ⇔ gkj (c) ≥ g
t
j(c), ∀j ∈ J,
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From this it follows that:
gsj (a) ≥ g
i
j(a) ≥ g
i
j(b) ≥ g
k
j (c) ≥ g
t
j(c), ∀j ∈ J ⇒ g
s
j (a) ≥ g
t
j(c), ∀j ∈ J ⇔ a∆
(s,t)c.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
1. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by point 4 of Proposition 2.1, we have ∆(1,n) ⊆ ∆(i,i) because, i ≥ 1
and i ≤ n; from this follows that ∆(1,n) ⊆ ∩ni=1∆
(i,i) = ∆ and this proves the first part of the
proposition.
For the same reason, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ∆(i,i) ⊆ ∆(n,1) because n ≥ i and 1 ≤ i. From
this it follows that ∆ = ∩ni=1∆
(i,i) ⊆ ∆(n,1); this proves the second part of the proposition.
2. For all i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by point 4 of Proposition 2.1, being 1 ≤ i and k ≤ n we have
∆(1,n) ⊆ ∆(i,k) and ∆(i,k) ⊆ ∆(n,1). In this way we obtain the thesis.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
1. Let a ∈ A and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For definition, fictitious alternatives a(i) and a(k) are such
that ∀j ∈ J , and ∀r ∈ {1, . . . , n} , grj
(
a(i)
)
= gij(a), and g
r
j
(
a(k)
)
= gkj (a). Being i ≥ k,
∀r ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ∀j ∈ J , grj (a
(i)) ≥ grj (a
(k)), and using the monotonicity of marginal value
functions uj,r(·) we obtain ∀r ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀j ∈ J uj,r(g
r
j (a
(i))) ≥ uj,r(g
r
j (a
(k))); adding up
with respect to j and r we obtain the thesis.
2. We have seen that:
U(a(1)) =
m∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=1
uj,i(g
1
j (a))
]
, U(a) =
m∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=1
uj,i(g
i
j(a))
]
, U(a(n)) =
m∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=1
uj,i(g
n
j (a))
]
.
∀j ∈ J, and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, being g1j (a) ≤ g
i
j(a) ≤ g
n
j (a) and by monotonicity of marginal
value functions uj,i(·), we obtain:
uj,i(g
1
j (a)) ≤ uj,i(g
i
j(a)) ≤ uj,i(g
n
j (a))
and therefore adding up with respect to j and i we obtain the thesis, that is
U(a(1)) ≤ U(a) ≤ U(a(n)).
3. See [13].
4. ∀a, b ∈ A, ∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if a(i) is at least as good as b(k) for all compatible value functions
(a %N(i,k) b), then there exists at least one compatible value function for which a
(i) is at least as
good as b(k) (a %P(i,k) b).
5. See [13].
6. See [13].
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7. See [13].
8. Let a, b ∈ A, such that a∆b. This implies that gij(a) ≥ g
i
j(b), ∀j ∈ J, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. We know
that, for all U ∈ U :
U(a) =
m∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=1
uj,i(g
i
j(a))
]
.
By monotonicity of marginal value functions uj,i(·), we have that ∀j ∈ J, and ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
uj,i(g
i
j(a)) ≥ uj,i(g
i
j(b)) and adding up with respect to indices j and i we obtain U(a) ≥ U(b)
for all compatible value functions, then we obtain the thesis.
9. See [13].
10. See [13].
11. It follows by point 8 of this Proposition, and by transitivity of %N .
12. It follows by point 8 of this Proposition, and by transitivity of %N .
13. It follows by points 8 and 9 of this Proposition.
14. It follows by points 8 and 10 of this Proposition.
15. Let a, b ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} , such that a∆(i,k)b. This implies that gij(a) ≥ g
k
j (b), ∀j ∈ J.
We know that, for all U ∈ U :
U(a(i)) =
m∑
j=1
[
n∑
r=1
uj,r(g
i
j(a))
]
, U(b(k)) =
m∑
j=1
[
n∑
r=1
uj,r(g
k
j (b))
]
.
By the monotonicity of marginal value functions uj,i(·) we have that ∀j ∈ J, and ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
uj,r(g
i
j(a)) ≥ uj,r(g
k
j (b)) and adding up with respect to indices j and r we obtain the thesis.
16. Let a, b, c ∈ A and i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N(i,n) b, b %
N c and r ≥ i. Then we have:


a %N(i,n) b ⇔ U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(n)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %N c ⇔ U(b) ≥ U(c), ∀U ∈ U ,
r ≥ i ⇒ U(a(r)) ≥ U(a(i)), ∀U ∈ U .
It follows that, for all U ∈ U , U(a(r)) ≥ U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c) ≥ U(c(1)) where
U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) and U(c) ≥ U(c(1)) hold by point 2 of this Proposition. Thus, for all U ∈ U we
obtain U(a(r)) ≥ U(c(1)), and therefore a %N(r,1) c.
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17. Let a, b, c ∈ A and k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N b, b %N(1,k) c and r ≤ k. Then we have:

a %N b ⇔ U(a) ≥ U(b), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %N(1,k) c ⇔ U(b
(1)) ≥ U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
r ≤ k ⇒ U(c(r)) ≤ U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U .
It follows that, for all U ∈ U , U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(k)) ≥ U(c(r)) where
U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) and U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) hold by point 2 of this Proposition. Thus, for all U ∈ U we
obtain U(a(n)) ≥ U(c(r)), and therefore a %N(n,r) c.
18. Let a, b, c ∈ A and i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %P(i,n) b, b %
N c and r ≥ i. Then we have:

a %P(i,n) b ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(n)),
b %N c ⇔ U(b) ≥ U(c), ∀U ∈ U ,
r ≥ i ⇒ U(a(r)) ≥ U(a(i)), ∀U ∈ U .
It follows that, there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(r)) ≥ U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c) ≥
U(c(1)) where U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) and U(c) ≥ U(c(1)) hold by point 2 of this Proposition. Thus,
there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(r)) ≥ U(c(1)), and therefore a %P(r,1) c.
19. Let a, b, c ∈ A and k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N b, b %P(1,k) c and r ≤ k. Then we have:

a %N b ⇔ U(a) ≥ U(b), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %P(1,k) c ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(b
(1)) ≥ U(c(k)),
r ≤ k ⇒ U(c(r)) ≤ U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U .
It follows that, there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(k)) ≥
U(c(r)) where U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) and U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) hold by point 2 of this Proposition. Thus,
there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(n)) ≥ U(c(r)), and therefore a %P(n,r) c.
20. Let a, b, c ∈ A and i, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N(i,n) b, b %
P c and r ≥ i. Then we have:

a %N(i,n) b ⇔ U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(n)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %P c ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(b) ≥ U(c),
r ≥ i ⇒ U(a(r)) ≥ U(a(i)), ∀U ∈ U .
It follows that, there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(r)) ≥ U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c) ≥
U(c(1)) where U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) and U(c) ≥ U(c(1)) hold by point 2 of this Proposition. Thus,
there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(r)) ≥ U(c(1)), and therefore a %P(r,1) c.
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21. Let a, b, c ∈ A and k, r ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %P b, b %N(1,k) c and r ≤ k. Then we have:

a %P b ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(b),
b %N(1,k) c ⇔ U(b
(1)) ≥ U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
r ≤ k ⇒ U(c(r)) ≤ U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U .
It follows that, there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(k)) ≥
U(c(r)) where U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) and U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) hold by point 2 of this Proposition. Thus,
there exists U ∈ U such that U(a(n)) ≥ U(c(r)), and therefore a %P(n,r) c.
22. It follows from points 15 and 16 of this Proposition.
23. It follows from points 15 and 17 of this Proposition.
24. It follows from points 15 and 20 of this Proposition.
25. It follows from points 15 and 21 of this Proposition.
26. It follows from points 8 and 17 of this Proposition.
27. It follows from points 8 and 16 of this Proposition.
28. It follows from points 8 and 19 of this Proposition.
29. It follows from points 8 and 18 of this Proposition.
30. It follows by point 1 of this Proposition.
31. Let a, b, c ∈ A and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that a %N(i,k) b, b %
N
(i,k) c and i ≤ k. Then we have:

a %N(i,k) b ⇔ U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %N(i,k) c ⇔ U(b
(i)) ≥ U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
By point 1 of this Proposition, U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(k)) ≥ U(b(i)) ≥ U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U ; thus U(a(i)) ≥
U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U and therefore a %N(i,k) c.
32. It follows by points 30 and 31 of this Proposition because i ≥ i implies %N(i,i) is reflexive, and
i ≤ i implies %N(i,i) is transitive.
33. Let a, b ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that a 6%N(i,k) b. This means that ∃U ∈ U : U(a
(i)) <
U(b(k)). Therefore, b %P(k,i) (a).
34. Let a, b ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i ≥ k such that a 6%P(i,k) b. This means that for all
U ∈ U , U(b(k)) > U(a(i)). Being i ≥ k, and by point 1 of this Proposition, we obtain that
for all U ∈ U , U(b(i)) ≥ U(b(k)) > U(a(i)) ≥ U(a(k)); thus for all U ∈ U , U(b(i)) > U(a(k)),
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therefore b %N(i,k) a implying b %
P
(i,k) a by point 4 of this Proposition. In this way %
P
(i,k) is
strongly complete.
Let a, b, c ∈ A, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that i ≥ k, a 6%P(i,k) b and b 6%
P
(i,k) c. Then we have:

a 6%P(i,k) b ⇔ U(a
(i)) < U(b(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b 6%P(i,k) c ⇔ U(b
(i)) < U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
From this and using point 1 of this Proposition it follows that
U(a(i)) < U(b(k)) ≤ U(b(i)) < U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U ⇒ U(a(i)) < U(c(k)), ∀U ∈ U ⇔ a 6%P(i,k) c.
This proves that %P(i,k) is negatively transitive.
35. Let a, b ∈ A, and i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that i1 ≥ i, k1 ≤ k and a %
N
(i,k) b. Then, by point
1 of this Proposition, we have:

a %N(i,k) b ⇔ U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
i1 ≥ i ⇒ U(a
(i1)) ≥ U(a(i)), ∀U ∈ U ,
k1 ≤ k ⇒ U(b
(k1)) ≤ U(b(k)), ∀U ∈ U .
Thus:
U(a(i1)) ≥ U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(k)) ≥ U(b(k1)), ∀U ∈ U ⇒ U(a(i1)) ≥ U(b(k1)), ∀U ∈ U ⇔ a %N(i1,k1) b.
36. Let a, b ∈ A, and i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that i1 ≥ i, k1 ≤ k and a %
P
(i,k) b. Then, by point
1 of this Proposition, we have:

a %P(i,k) b ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(k)),
i1 ≥ i ⇒ U(a
(i1)) ≥ U(a(i)), ∀U ∈ U ,
k1 ≤ k ⇒ U(b
(k1)) ≤ U(b(k)), ∀U ∈ U .
Thus:
∃U ∈ U : U(a(i1)) ≥ U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(k)) ≥ U(b(k1))⇒ ∃U ∈ U : U(a(i1)) ≥ U(b(k1))⇔ a %P(i1,k1) b.
37. For all i, k = 1, . . . , n, it is true that i ≥ 1 and k ≤ n; thus by point 35 of this Proposition, we
have %N(1,n) ⊆ %
N
(i,k); at the same time, being n ≥ i and 1 ≤ k, by point 35 of this Proposition,
we have %N(i,k) ⊆ %
N
(n,1) . In this way we obtain the thesis, that is %
N
(1,n) ⊆ %
N
(i,k) ⊆ %
N
(n,1) .
38. For all i, k = 1, . . . , n, it is true that i ≥ 1 and k ≤ n; thus by point 36 of this Proposition, we
have %P(1,n) ⊆ %
P
(i,k); at the same time, being n ≥ i and 1 ≤ k, by point 36 of this Proposition,
we have %P(i,k) ⊆ %
P
(n,1) . In this way we obtain the thesis, that is %
P
(1,n) ⊆ %
P
(i,k) ⊆ %
P
(n,1) .
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39. Let a, b ∈ A such that a %N(1,n) b. This means that U(a
(1)) ≥ U(b(n)), ∀U ∈ U . By point 2 of
this Proposition, we have that U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b), ∀U ∈ U , and thus we obtain
U(a) ≥ U(b), ∀U ∈ U , that is a %N b. In this way we proved that %N(1,n) ⊆ %
N .
Analogously, a %N b means that U(a) ≥ U(b), ∀U ∈ U ; by point 2 of this Proposition we obtain
U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1)), ∀U ∈ U , and thus we have U(a(n)) ≥ U(b(1)), ∀U ∈ U , that
is a %N(n,1) b. In this way we proved that %
N ⊆ %N(n,1) .
40. Let a, b ∈ A such that a %P(1,n) b. This means that ∃U ∈ U : U(a
(1)) ≥ U(b(n)). By point 2 of
this Proposition we have:
U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b)⇒ U(a) ≥ U(b)⇔ a %P b.
In this way we proved that %P(1,n) ⊆ %
P .
Analogously, a %P b means that ∃U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(b); by point 2. of this Proposition we
obtain:
U(a(n)) ≥ U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1))⇒ U(a(n)) ≥ U(b(1))⇔ a %P(n,1) b.
In this way we proved that %P ⊆ %P(n,1) .
41. Let a, b, c ∈ A and i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that a %
N
(i,k) b, b %
N
(i1,k1)
c and k ≥ i1. Then we
have: 

a %N(i,k) b ⇔ U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %N(i1,k1) c ⇔ U(b
(i1)) ≥ U(c(k1)), ∀U ∈ U ,
k ≥ i1 ⇒ U(b
(k)) ≥ U(b(i1))
From this it follows:
U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(k)) ≥ U(b(i1)) ≥ U(c(k1)), ∀U ∈ U ⇒ U(a(i)) ≥ U(c(k1)), ∀U ∈ U ⇔ a %N(i,k1) c.
Being a %N(i,k1) c and r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n}: r ≥ i and s ≤ k1, by point 35 of this Proposition we
obtain a %N(r,s) c.
42. Let a, b, c ∈ A, and i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that a %
N
(i,k) b, b %
P
(i1,k1)
c, and k ≥ i1. Then
we have: 

a %N(i,k) b ⇔ U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(k)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %P(i1,k1) c ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(b
(i1)) ≥ U(c(k1)),
k ≥ i1 ⇒ U(b
(k)) ≥ U(b(i1)), ∀U ∈ U .
It follows that:
∃U ∈ U : U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(k)) ≥ U(b(i1)) ≥ U(c(k1))⇒ ∃U ∈ U : U(a(i)) ≥ U(c(k1))⇔ a %P(i,k1) c.
Being r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n}: r ≥ i and s ≤ k1, by point 36 of this Proposition we obtain a %
P
(r,s) c.
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43. Let a, b, c ∈ A, i, k, i1, k1 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %
P
(i,k) b, b %
N
(i1,k1)
c, and k ≥ i1. We have that:

a %P(i,k) b ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(a
(i)) ≥ U(b(k)),
b %N(i1,k1) c ⇔ U(b
(i1)) ≥ U(c(k1)), ∀U ∈ U ,
k ≥ i1 ⇒ U(b
(k)) ≥ U(b(i1)), ∀U ∈ U .
From this it follows:
∃U ∈ U : U(a(i)) ≥ U(b(k)) ≥ U(b(i1)) ≥ U(c(k1))⇒ ∃U ∈ U : U(a(i)) ≥ U(c(k1))⇔ a %P(i,k1) c.
Being r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that r ≥ i and s ≤ k1, by point 36 of this Proposition we obtain
a %P(r,s) c.
44. It follows from points 15 and 41 of this Proposition.
45. It follows from points 15 and 41 of this Proposition.
46. It follows from points 15 and 42 of this Proposition.
47. It follows from points 15 and 43 of this Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof of all points of this Proposition are straightforward consequences of Proposition 4.1 except for
the following points:
1. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a %SN b and b %N c; it follows that:

a %SN b ⇔ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %N c ⇔ U(b) ≥ U(c), ∀U ∈ U .
By point 2 of Proposition 4.1 we have that for all U ∈ U , U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) and U(b(n)) ≥ U(b)
thus,
U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c), ∀U ∈ U
and therefore U(a) ≥ U(c), for all U ∈ U obtaining the thesis.
2. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a %SN b and b %P c; it follows that:

a %SN b ⇔ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %P c ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(b) ≥ U(c).
By point 2 of Proposition 4.1 we have that for all U ∈ U , U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) and U(b(n)) ≥ U(b)
thus,
∃U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c),
and therefore there exists U ∈ U such that U(a) ≥ U(c), obtaining the thesis.
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3. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a %N b and b %SN c; it follows that:

a %N b ⇔ U(a) ≥ U(b), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %SN c ⇔ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(n)), ∀U ∈ U .
By point 2 of Proposition 4.1 we have that for all U ∈ U , U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) and U(c(n)) ≥ U(c)
thus,
U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(n)) ≥ U(c), ∀U ∈ U
and therefore U(a) ≥ U(c) for all U ∈ U , obtaining the thesis.
4. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a %N b and b %SP c; it follows that:

a %N b ⇔ U(a) ≥ U(b), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %SP c ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(n)).
By point 2 of Proposition 4.1 we have that for all U ∈ U , U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) and U(c(n)) ≥ U(c)
thus,
∃U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(n)) ≥ U(c),
and therefore there exists U ∈ U such that U(a) ≥ U(c), obtaining the thesis.
5. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a %SP b and b %N c; it follows that:

a %SP b ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)),
b %N c ⇔ U(b) ≥ U(c), ∀U ∈ U .
By point 2 of Proposition 4.1 we have that for all U ∈ U , U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) and U(b(n)) ≥ U(b)
thus,
∃U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c),
and therefore there exists U ∈ U such that U(a) ≥ U(c), obtaining the thesis.
6. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a %P b and b %SN c; it follows that:

a %P b ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(b),
b %SN c ⇔ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(n)), ∀U ∈ U ,
By point 2 of Proposition 4.1 we have that for all U ∈ U , U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) and U(c(n)) ≥ U(c)
thus,
∃U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(b(1)) ≥ U(c(n)) ≥ U(c),
and therefore there exists U ∈ U such that U(a) ≥ U(c), obtaining the thesis.
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13. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a∆Sb and b %N c. By point 15 of Proposition 4.1, it follows that
a %SN c. Then: 

a %SN b ⇔ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %N c ⇔ U(b) ≥ U(c), ∀U ∈ U ,
thus, for all U ∈ U , we obtain U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c), where U(a) ≥ U(a(1))
and U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) hold by point 2 of Proposition 4.1. Therefore U(a) ≥ U(c) for all U ∈ U
from which the thesis a %N c.
16. Let a, b, c ∈ A such that a∆Sb and b %P c. By point 15 of Proposition 4.1, it follows that
a %SN c. Then: 

a %SN b ⇔ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)), ∀U ∈ U ,
b %P c ⇔ ∃U ∈ U : U(b) ≥ U(c),
thus, there exists U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) ≥ U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) ≥ U(c), where U(a) ≥ U(a(1)) and
U(b(n)) ≥ U(b) hold by point 2 of Proposition 4.1. Therefore there exists U ∈ U : U(a) ≥ U(c)
from which the thesis a %P c.
20. It follows from point 8 of Proposition 4.1 and from point 3 of this Proposition.
21. It follows from point 8 of Proposition 4.1 and from point 4 of this Proposition.
26. It follows from point 8 of Proposition 4.1 and from point 1 of this Proposition.
31. It follows from point 15 of Proposition 4.1 and from point 3 of this Proposition.
36. It follows from point 8 of Proposition 4.1 and from point 5 of this Proposition.
40. It follows from point 15 of Proposition 4.1 and from point 6 of this Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Let a, b ∈ A and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %R1,R2
(i,k),D′
b, i1 ≥ i and k1 ≤ k and consider the following
cases:
• R2 = N ; then a %
R1,R2
(i,k),D′
b means that a %R1(i,k) b for all DMs. Being %
R1 ⊆ %R
′
1 , we have
a %
R
′
1
(i,k) b for all DMs; being i1 ≥ i and k1 ≤ k, by point 35 (if R1 = N) or 36 (if R1 = P ) of
Proposition 4.1 we have a %
R
′
1
(i1,k1)
b for all DMs (that is a %
R
′
1
,R
′
2
(i1,k1),D
′ b with R
′
2 = N) implying
also a %
R
′
1
(i1,k1)
b for at least one DM (that is a %
R
′
1
,R
′
2
(i1,k1),D
′ b with R
′
2 = P.)
• R2 = P ; then a %
R1,R2
(i,k),D
′ b means that a %
R1
(i,k) b for at least one DM, dh ∈ D
′
. Being %R1 ⊆ %R
′
1 ,
we have a %
R
′
1
(i,k) b for at least one DM dh ∈ D
′
; being i1 ≥ i and k1 ≤ k, by point 35 (if R1 = N)
or 36 (if R1 = P ) of Proposition 4.1 we have a %
R
′
1
(i1,k1)
b for at least one DM, dh ∈ D
′
(that is
a %
R
′
1
,R
′
2
(i1,k1),D
′ b with R
′
2 = P ).
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Proof of Proposition 4.4
1. It follows from point 39 of Proposition 4.1;
2. It follows from point 40 of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
1. Let a, b ∈ A and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a 6%N,N
(i,k),D′
b. This means that there exists at least
one DM, dh ∈ D
′
, such that a 6%N(i,k) b; from this, by point 33 of Proposition 4.1, we have
b %P(k,i) a for at least one DM, dh ∈ D
′
, and therefore b %P,P
(k,i),D′
a.
2. Let a, b ∈ A and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a 6%N,P
(i,k),D′
b. This means that for all DMs, dh ∈ D
′
,
a 6%N(i,k) b; from this, by point 33 of Proposition 4.1, we have b %
P
(k,i) a for all DMs, dh ∈ D
′
,
therefore b %P,N
(k,i),D′
a.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Let be a, b, c ∈ A, and i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that a %N,R1
(i,k),D′
b b %N,R2
(i1,k1),D
′ c and k ≥ i1. We can
consider the following cases:
• If R1 = R2 = N then a %
N,R1
(i,k),D′
b means that a %N(i,k) b for all DMs dh ∈ D
′
, and b %N,R2
(i1,k1),D
′ c
means that b %N(i1,k1) c for all DMs. By point 41 of Proposition 4.1 we have a %
N
(r,s) c for all
DMs, dh ∈ D
′
thus a %N,N
(r,s),D
′ c.
• If R1 = N and R2 = P then a %
N,R1
(i,k),D
′ b means that a %N(i,k) b for all DMs dh ∈ D
′
, and
b %N,R2
(i1,k1),D
′ c means that b %N(i1,k1) c for at least one DM, dh ∈ D
′
. By point 41 of Proposition
4.1 we have a %N(r,s) c for at least one DM, dh ∈ D
′
, thus a %N,P
(r,s),D
′ c.
• If R1 = P and R2 = N then a %
N,R1
(i,k),D′
b means that a %N(i,k) b for at least one DM dh ∈ D
′
,
and b %N,R2
(i1,k1),D
′ c means that b %N(i1,k1) c for all DMs, dh ∈ D
′
. By point 41 of Proposition 4.1
we have a %N(r,s) c for at least one DM, dh ∈ D
′
, thus a %N,P
(r,s),D′
c.
The second and the third part of this Proposition can be proved analogously to the first part, using
points 42 and 43 of Proposition 4.1, respectively.
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